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"PLAIN VIEW"-ANYTH1ING BUT PLAIN:
COOLIDGE DIVIDES TIE LOWER COURTS
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,' the United States Supreme Court
rejected the contention that evidence obtained by the search of an
impounded car2 was admissible under the plain view exception 3 to the
1. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
2. Petitioner Coolidge had become a suspect in the murder of a 14-year-old girl
whose body was found by the side of a highway, shot and stabbed to death. After
learning that the petitioner had been away from home the evening of the girl's disap-
pearance, the police questioned him and enough evidence was obtained for the issuance
of search warrants and an arrest warrant. The same day that Coolidge was arrested
at his home and taken into custody, his wife was informed that their two cars which
were parked in the driveway had been impounded. The cars were towed to the police
station where two days later a search of one of them was conducted. Searches of the
car were conducted again a year later in January, 1965, and in April, 1965. Vacuum
sweepings of the car taken in these three searches helped establish that the victim had
been in one of Coolidge's cars. Id. at 445-48.
The Supreme Court first held that the warrants signed by the State Attorney General
who had conducted the investigation and who prosecuted Coolidge at the trial were
defective because they had not been issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate." Id.
at 453. The state was therefore forced to attempt to bring the searches within
the exceptions to the warrant requirement developed for searches of automobiles (see
note 7 infra) and for searches incident to arrest (see note 6 infra), as well as within
the plain view exception.
3. In the past, the term "plain view" has been applied to three visually similar but
factually distinct situations which are often confused in discussions of the plain view
doctrine. The first situation is a non-intrusive visual observation where evidence is
in "open view" and seizable in an area that is not constitutionally protected, such as
a city street or an open field. See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59
(1924). Another situation is the pre-intrusion observation of evidence in open view
inside a constitutionally protected area such as a house or auto from a vantage point
outside that area. This visual observation is not a search. It furnishes probable cause
but does not alone justify an intrusion. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 292 A.2d 762, 768
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972). One example was pointed out in Kuipers, Suspicious Ob-
jects, Probabld Cause, and the Law of Search and Seizure, 21 DRAKE L REv. 252, 266
(1972):
Very frequently a constitutionally seizable object is observed in plain view
within a motor vehicle. Once probable cause is shown, immediate warrantless
seizure of the item is usually permissible, since exigent circumstances in the form
of mobility are almost always present.
In order to avoid confusion, the court in Scales v. State, 284 A.2d 45, 47 n.1 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1971), suggested that other phrases, such as "open to public gaze," be
used in the non-intrusive situation.
The third or "true" plain view situation refers to a post-intrusion observation in
which a prior, valid intrusion has been extended to those objects in plain view from
a legitimate viewing point. It is this third situation with which Coolidge and this
Comment are concerned.
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warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. 4  While Justice Stew-
art's plurality opinion5 contains important discussions of other excep-
tions to the warrant requirement, i.e., searches incident to arrest and
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
In discussing the rationale for the plain view exception, Justice Stewart emphasized
the constitutional protections served by the warrant requirement. "First, the magis-
trate's scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not based on probable
cause." 403 U.S. at 467. The second objective is to protect against general, explora-
tory rummaging through a person's belongings by limiting the searches as much as pos-
sible. The plain view doctrine does not conflict with the first objective since plain view
does not occur unless a valid search is already underway. The doctrine is also consistent
with the second objective since, given the initial intrusion, the search is not converted
into a general or exploratory one merely by the seizure of an object in plain view.
Id.
5. Only Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall concurred in Part 11-C of Justice
Stewart's opinion which contains the discussion of plain view. Justice Harlan con-
curred with Parts I, 11-D and III. Chief Justice Burger joined in Part I and filed
a concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in a portion of Part I and
in Parts 11 and 1. Justice White filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in which
Chief Justice Burger joined. Because Part 11-C was signed by only four of the Court's
members, its authority has been questioned. See notes 136-40 and accompanying text
infra.
6. The State's first theory in support of the warrantless seizure and search of the
car was that it was incident to a valid arrest. Since the events took place before Chi-
mel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which restricted the scope of a search incident
to arrest to the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control, the Court
applied the standard of United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), that a war-
rantless search incident to arrest could extend to the area considered to be in the "pos-
session" or under the "control" of the person arrested. The Court pointed out that
even under this standard "a lawful pre-Chimel arrest of a suspect outside his house
could never by itself justify a warrantless search inside the house." 403 U.S. at 456.
It held that the result would be no different if, as in Coolidge, the arrest was made
inside the house and the search was made outside. Furthermore, even if, for the sake
of argument, the police could have searched the car at the time of arrest, they "could
not legally seize the car, remove it, and search it at their leisure without a warrant."
Id. at 457, citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). Thus, the search-
incident doctrine could not be used to sustain the search.
The relationship between the standards set in Coolidge for plain view and those set in
Chimel for a search incident to arrest raises some important questions. In Chimel,
the Court limited the scope of a search incident to arrest to "a search of the arrestee's
person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evi-
dence." 395 U.S. at 763. The Court in Coolidge pointed out that the "plain view"
exception was not inconsistent with Chimel, for when
the arresting officer inadvertently comes within plain view of a piece of evidence,
not concealed, although outside of the area under the immediate control of the
arrestee, the officer may seize it, so long as the plain view was obtained in the
course of an appropriately limited search of the arrestee.
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searches of movable vehicles,7 the opinion's discussion of the plain view
exception8 has also been the subject of some controversy.9 With the
403 U.S. at 465 n.24. Various problems arise when police take a cursory look around
other parts of a house or building for suspects or accomplices. Although these areas
are outside the immediate control of the arrestee and thus seemingly beyond the scope
of searches permitted by Chimel, some courts have justified such cursory intrusions as
necessary to police safety. If the police see an incriminating object in plain view dur-
ing the course of this quick inspection, may it be seized? Most courts have answered
affirmatively.
In United States v. Broomfield, 336 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Mich. 1972), agents of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs went to the home of the defendants. Out-
side of the house they arrested one defendant who then indicated that he wished to
go inside. Upon entering, the agents "secured the house" by looking through all of
the rooms for possible accomplices. While looking into a walk-in closet, one agent saw
several handguns and long guns. There was also a small shoe box containing some-
thing which appeared to be marijuana on a vanity dresser. The seizure of the mari-
juana was said to be justified under the plain view doctrine since there were "exigent
circumstances" which would allow the agents to check the whole house for possible
accomplices. Id. at 184-85. The court considered such factors as the prior criminal
record of the defendant which indicated a propensity for violence and the credibility
of the police witnesses.
Similarly, in People v. Block, 6 Cal. 3d 239, 499 P.2d 961, 103 Cal. Rptr. 281
(1971), the court upheld the search of some upstairs bedrooms of a house in which
the defendants were arrested on the first floor. The court emphasized:
A corollary of the "plain sight" rule, and one which is pertinent to the instant
case, is that "During a lawful search of premises for persons believed to be in
hiding, police officers may seize contraband evidence 'in plain sight.' . . . Under
such circumstances there is, in fact, no search for evidence."
Id. at 243, 499 P.2d at 963, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 283. The court, though, was
cautious in pointing out that the facts and circumstances of some cases will not justify
"a general exploratory search for 'possible suspects.'" Id.
The police officers in State v. Vineyard, 497 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973), also
believed that other persons might be hiding in a house where one of the suspects was
arrested. Thus, the court held that they had a right to conduct a search of the prem-
ises and that the seizure of stolen shirts in plain view was lawful. Id. at 826. For an
extensive discussion of this issue, see Note, Search and Seizure Since Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 55 MINN. L. Rav. 1011, 1021-24 (1971).
7. The second theory put forth by the state was that, under Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925), and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), probable cause
alone enabled police to search a car at the scene or even after transporting it to the
police station. 403 U.S. at 458. However, the Court made clear that the automobile
exception did not apply to the facts of Coolidge for there was
no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open highway
after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no confeder-
ates waiting to move the evidence, not even the inconvenience of a special police
detail to guard the immobilized automobile. In short, by no possible stretch of
the legal imagination can this be made into a case where "it is not practicable
to secure a warrant," . . . and the "automobile exception," despite its label, is sim-
ply irrelevant.
Id. at 462 (citation omitted).
8. 403 U.S. at 464-73.
9. See, e.g., LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ven-
tures Into the "Quagmire," 8 CRim. L. BULL. 9 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LaFave];
Landynski, The Supreme Court's Search for Fourth Amendment Standards: The Extra-
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enunciation of the criteria for the application of the doctrine, the Court
arguably ended' ° a long history" of uncertainty as to the meaning of
ordinary Case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 45 CoNN. B.J. 330, 336-38, 349-53
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Landynski]; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv.
L. REv. 3, 243-50 (1971) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court]; Comment, Constiltu-
tional Law-Search and Seizure-Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
695, 699-700, 703 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Search and Seizure]; 1972 DicK. L. REV.
333, 338-41.
10. But see note 5 supra and notes 136-40 infra and accompanying text.
11. Before Coolidge, plain view had been a descriptive phrase which was "intimately
linked with the search-incident exception." 403 US. at 482. See note 6 supra. The
permissible extent of a search and seizure incident to arrest had alternated over a long
period between broad and limited scopes. In the prohibition era case of Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), officers executing a warrant to search for and
seize contraband liquor seized a ledger from a closet in which they were searching for
the liquor. The Court upheld the seizures as incident to the lawful arrest: "The au-
thority of officers to search and seize the things by which the nuisance was being main-
tained extended to all parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose." Id. at
199. The Court did not discuss a plain view exception to the warrant requirement,
perhaps because any discussion of plain view would be superfluous in view of the vir-
tually unlimited scope the Marron Court gave to a search incident to arrest. See, e.g.,
Brown v. State, 292 A.2d 762, 766 n.17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) where the court
observed that
the very notion of "plain view" is completely moot during periods of broad scope
of a "search incident," since the more extensive and intensive right to make a
thorough search of an entire premises subsumes the lesser right to make a mere
seizure of those things in "plain view" therein.
Later, though, the Court reversed itself. In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), an officer had no warrant to search an office but did
so after arresting the defendant. In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932),
officers with nothing more than an arrest warrant made an extensive search of the
arrestee's business. In each case, the Court purported to distinguish Marron by stating
that the items in Marron were in plain view and were seized as an incident of the
arrest rather than in a general search. 285 U.S. at 465; 282 U.S. at 358. In each
case, as Justice Stewart points out, the Court emphasized the "plain view" aspect of Mar-
ron "in order to avoid the implication that arresting officers are entitled to make an
exploratory search of the premises where the arrest occurs." 403 U.S. at 470 n.26.
The next important case in "search incident" law was Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947), which virtually ignored Go-Bart and Lefkowitz in holding that a search
may extend to the entire premises where the arrest is made. As in Marron, plain view
was not mentioned since this notion was unnecessary in view of the Court's "broad
scope" approach to searches incident to arrest. However, Justice Murphy's dissent fore-
shadowed the plain view doctrine by referring to a "plain sight" seizure:
Seizure may be made of articles and papers on the person of the one arrested.
And the arresting officer is free to look around and seize those fruits and evi-
dences of crime which are in plain sight and in his immediate and discernible
presence.
Id. at 186 (citations omitted). Then in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699
(1948), the arrest of a defendant operating an illegal distillery was held valid since
the agents saw the defendant operating the distillery. However, the seizure of the still,
although it was in plain view, was held invalid. The Court pointed out that the agents
had known of the existence of the seized still long before the seizure and that the seizure
of the still was one of the main purposes of the raid, Id. at 705-07. The government
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plain view. The opinion held that a seizure is justified by the plain view
exception only when the police have a prior justification for an in-
trusion,12 when the incriminating nature of the object seized is im-
mediately apparent,"3 and when its discovery is inadvertent.'4 This
Comment focuses on the lower courts' attempt to interpret and apply
two of the requirements-"immediately apparent" and "inadvertence."
I. "ImnvmDIATELY APPARENT"
Even if an object is in plain view, it may not be seized unless its
incriminating nature is immediately apparent.'5 The extension of the
prior justification for an intrusion
is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to an-
tried to argue that, based upon a long line of cases,
an arresting officer may look around at the time of the arrest and seize those
fruits and evidences of crime or those contraband articles which are in plain sight
and in his immediate and discernible presence.
Id. at 704. However, the Court concluded that no reason had been shown why the
agents could not have obtained a search warrant. Id. at 708. Thus, Trupiano was
the first case which stated the requirement of "inadvertence" in fourth amendment law.
The dissent in Trupiano, however, rejected this requirement:
[W]here law-enforcement agents have lawfully gained entrance into premises and
have executed a valid arrest of the occupant, the vital rights of privacy protected
by the Fourth Amendment are not denied by seizure of contraband materials and
instrumentalities of crime in open view or such as may be brought to light by
a reasonable search.
Id. at 714. It is interesting to note that this was the same argument employed by
Justice White in his Coolidge dissent. 403 U.S. at 515.
Trupiano was in turn overruled in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 5 6, 66
(1950), which held that the test was "not whether it is reasonable to procure a search
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dis-
sent laid the groundwork for the parameters of a search incident to arrest which was
finally adopted in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In his dissent, he dis-
tinguished between the permissibility of a seizure and the permissible scope of a search
in "search incident" law:
This progressive distortion is due to an uncritical confusion of (1) the right
to search the person arrested and articles in his immediate physical control and
(2) the right to seize visible instruments or fruits of crime at the scene of the
arrest with (3) an alleged right to search the place of arrest. It is necessary in
this connection to distinguish clearly between prohibited searches and improper
seizures. It is unconstitutional to make an improper search even for articles that
are appropriately subject to seizure when found by legal means .... Thus, the
seizure of items properly subject to seizure because in open view at the time of
arrest does not carry with it the right to search for such items.
339 U.S. at 75. A seizure of items in plain view, then, was not a search.
12. 403 U.S. at 466.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 469-71.
15. Id. at 466.
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other until something incriminating at last emerges.' 6
The lower courts have experienced many difficulties with this aspect
of the opinion. First, there is the problem of determining whether
or not an object is in plain view. For example, what if the object
is contained in a paper bag or is a private paper which has to be read
or examined more closely in order for its incriminating nature to be
revealed?17  Second, there is the problem of determining the degree
of "apparency" (a suspicion, probable cause, or virtual certainty) nec-
essary in order for objects to be seized lawfully under the plain view
doctrine.
A. What is "Plain View"?
Often law enforcement officers will see a container which prevents
them from actually seeing the contraband that they believe is con-
tained therein. In order to bring such situations within the plain view
doctrine, some courts have introduced the phrase "constructive sight."
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals first did so in United States v.
Welsch.' There the defendant had opened a suitcase full of narcotics
in the presence of two undercover agents who then took a sample,
ostensibly to test it before buying.'9 Twenty minutes later, after de-
termining that the sample contained narcotics, the agents returned to
the room. 0 They arrested the defendant and pulled the suitcase out
from underneath the bed where it could not be seen during the ar-
rest.2' The court in upholding the seizure concluded that the case
was "within the Coolidge-Chimel 'plain sight' space limitations al-
though only in constructive sight. '' 22  The Tenth Circuit apparently
invented the term "constructive sight" to cover the facts of the case,
16. Id.
17. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571-72 (1969) (concurring opinion). Jus-
tice Stewart maintained in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Brennan and White
that police officers who discovered and seized motion pictures while conducting a
search pursuant to a valid warrant had acted unlawfully since the films were not listed
in the warrant:
This is not a case where agents in the course of a lawful search came upon
contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence in plain view. For the record
makes clear that the contents of the films could not be determined by mere inspec-
tion.
Id. at 571 (footnote omitted). The majority in Stanley decided the case on first amend-
ment grounds and thus did not discuss the problem of the seizure per se. Id. at 568.
18. 446 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1971).
19. Id. at 221.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 222.
22. Id. gt 223,
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for although the contents of the suitcase and even the suitcase itself
were not visible,23 the agents had every reason to believe that the
narcotics they had previously seen were still in the suitcase. 4
Concededly the Welsch case arose from difficult and perhaps unique
facts, but the court facilely transformed Coolidge's limited and care-
fully confined plain view exception 25 to the warrant requirement into
a "no view" exception. The insertion of the cosmetic label of "con-
structive sight" does not diminish the peril to the Coolidge rule. This
was pointed out in United States v. Brewer26 where the constructive
sight concept was criticized:
The real danger in supplementing the "plain sight" exception with
the . . . "constructive sight" approach is that it can prove too much.
If the informant in this case had told the agents that the marijuana
was in a desk in the bedroom, or a closet in the bedroom, or just in
the bedroom itself, and the agents could see each of these three things
from the point where they arrested Brewer, then a seizure and search
of the desk, closet or room would seemingly be permissible and the
seizure of any evidence thereby found would have to be approved.
Thus, the "plain view" and Chimel exceptions would be expanded be-
yond apparent limits.
2
Although some courts have not explicitly adopted a "constructive
sight" doctrine, they seem to be following 'the Welsch approach.
28
For example, in United States v. Rothberg, 9 the police arrested and
searched the defendant in his living room.30 They then took him into
23. Id. at 222.
24. Id.
25. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
26. 343 F. Supp. 468 (D. Hawaii 1972). In this case, the police arrested the de-
fendant at his door. From this vantage point they could see two footlockers in the
bedroom. It was only when the lockers were opened that marijuana came into view.
The government argued that "because the footlockers were in plain view and the agents
were told that they contained marihuana, ergo the marihuana should be considered as
if in fact it was in plain view." Id. at 474. The court distinguished Welsch since
in that case the agent's knowledge of the object seized was based upon firsthand obser-
vation, there was a short time lapse involved and the suitcase in Welsch was "within
the ambit of Chimel." Id.
27. Id. at 474 n.4.
28. In United States v. Candella, 469 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1972), the court held
that the defendants had consented to the seizure of guns contained in a box. In
addition, however, the guns were admissible because
in practical effect they were in "plain view" of the agents. . . . Here, once the
appellee told the agents where the guns were, they were no longer "concealed"
and it was reasonable for the agents to seize them.
Id.
29. 345 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
30. Id. at 1333.
1974]
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the kitchen where a suitcase was seen near the kitchen door.31 The
arresting officer, who had been told by an informer before entering
the home of the defendant that the suitcase contained hashish,3 2 seized
the suitcase,s opened it,34 and found the hashish." The court held
that the plain view exception applied since the officers had "definite
knowledge"38 that the suitcase contained hashish. Holding that the
search and seizure was proper under Coolidge, the court maintained:
To permit the officers to seize that suitcase but not to allow them to
open it when they knew that it contained hashish and did not have
time to obtain a search warrant seems to this court an untenable dis-
tinction.32
Another court employed a similar approach in determining when
an object is in plain view under the rubric of "totality of the circum-
stances." In State v. Palmer,8 a paper bag "challenged" a police offi-
cer's attention.3 9 The totality of the circumstances, such as the defend-
ant's fumbling with the paper bag4" and the impracticability of obtain-
ing a search warrant,41 furnished probable cause for the seizure of the
contents of the paper bag.42 The court stated that it was "a case of
satisfying a lawful curiosity arising in the course of performance of
[the officer's] duty. '43  Such reasoning, however, ignores the Coolidge
emphasis in discussing the "immediately apparent" requirement that
"the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general explor-
atory search from one object to another until something incriminating
at last emerges."4 4  This approach also overlooks the simple fact that
it is the container, and not its contents, that is in plain view. The lin-
guistic bootstrapping advanced by phrases such as "totality of the cir-






36. Id. at 1334.
37. Id. at 1334-35. Even though the court believed the seizure was proper under
Coolidge, it was uncertain of the search. It concluded, though, that even if the Cool-
idge exception was inapplicable, the search had been consented to by the defendant.
Id. at 1335.
38. 487 P.2d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
39. Id. at 630.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 631.
43. Id.
44. 403 U.S. at 466.
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Welsch and Palmer courts simply evaded the plain view requirement.
One can but wonder if they would employ even more picturesque eva-
sions if confronted with slightly more complex facts. Had the Welsch
suitcase contained in turn a briefcase, for example, the language might
have been enriched by a term such as "constructive constructive sight."
On the other hand, had the suitcase been found in a closet, it would
seem not too difficult to classify the closet, if not the very room, as
just one more container in "constructive sight."
Some courts have rejected the "totality of the circumstances" and
"constructive sight" approaches for reasons such as the above. For
example, in Erickson v. State,45 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
the plain view exception did not apply even when a private citizen
said that he had seen marijuana inside a suitcase which he delivered
to the police.4 The court pointed out that "the contraband was not
in plain view so as to obviate a search."47  Similarly, in United States
v. Babich,48 the court held that marijuana was not in plain view even
though officers could smell it.49  The California Supreme Court has
vacillated on the issue. The court first took a strict approach to the
problem of plain view and closed containers. In People v. Marshall, °
the police had heard from an informant that marijuana in a brown
paper bag was .to be found in the defendant's apartment.5" Without a
search or arrest warrant, but with probable cause to arrest the defend-
ant, 2 the officers picked .the lock and entered the apartment.53  No
one was in the apartment,54 but "[o]ne officer detected a sweet odor
similar to that of the marijuana defendant had given the informant." 55
The marijuana was found in a closet inside a closed brown paper
bag.5" The court rejected the state's contention that the odor, together
with the informant's report, gave the officer a justification for the sei-
zure without a warrant:
This contention overlooks the difference between probable cause to
believe contraband will be found, which justifies the issuance of a
45. 407 P.2d 508 (Alas. 1973).
46. Id. at 513.
47. Id.
48. 347 F. Supp. 157 (D. Nev. 1972).
49. Id. at 160.
50. 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968).
51. Id. at 54, 442 P.2d at 667, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
52. Id.
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search warrant, and observation of contraband in plain sight, which jus-
tifies seizure without a warrant. However strongly convinced officers
may be that a search will reveal contraband, their belief whether based
on the sense of smell or other sources, does not justify a search without
a warrant.5
7
The opinion went on to discuss why officers could rely on a sense
of smell only to confirm an observation of visible contraband and not to
justify -the warrantless seizure of invisible contents:
To hold, however, that an odor, either alone or with other evidence
of invisible contents can be deemed the same as or corollary to plain
view, would open the door to snooping and rummaging through per-
sonal effects. Even a most acute sense of smell might mislead officers
into fruitless invasions of privacy where no contraband is found."8
Thus, Marshall clearly held that the odor, even if it was accompanied
by other evidence, such as the knowledge of the contents gained be-
forehand from the informant, was not the equivalent of plain view.""
However, the California Supreme Court has seemingly overruled
Marshall in a more recent decision, Guidi v. Superior Court. 0 There
police officers had been informed that the suspects were at an apart-
ment with twenty bricks of hashish wrapped in plastic bags inside a
57. Id. at 57, 442 P.2d at 668, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 558. The court continued:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous offi-
cers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disin-
terested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making
a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave
the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.
Id. at 57, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
58. 69 Cal. 2d at 59, 442 P.2d at 669-70, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90 (emphasis ad-
ded).
59. Id.
60. 10 Cal. 3d 1, 513 P.2d 908, 109 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1973). The opinion of the
Guidi court (joined on this point by only three justices) disclaimed any overruling of
Marshall:
Our decision in the instant case is based on grounds not raised or argued by the
parties in Marshall and consequently not considered by the court in its opinion
therein-the power of the police to seize as "mere evidence" a bag previously de-
scribed as having borne contraband, when such a bag is properly viewed in plain
sight. To the extent that People v. Marshall is inconsistent with the views stated
herein, it is no longer to be followed.
Id. at 17 n.18, 513 P.2d at 919 n.18, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 695 n.18 (citation omitted).
It would seem that this distinction is untenable, for Marshall specifically stated that
"an odor, either alone or with other evidence of invisible contents is not 'plain view.'"
69 Cal. 2d at 59, 442 P.2d at 669-70, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90 (emphasis added). The
"other evidence" category could presumably include an officer's prior knowledge of the
contents of such a container. Thus, the distinction is not viable and the concurring
PLAIN VIEW
brown grocery bag.61  The police entered without an arrest or search
warrant and arrested the suspects. 2 One officer saw a shopping bag
behind the kitchen counter and said that he became aware of the "dis-
tinctive odor of hashish."' 3 The court reasoned that the bag itself
would have been "relevant evidence of the presumably disputed fact
that the accused had as alleged offered the drugs for sale."64  How-
ever, the court did not uphold the seizure on this point alone. Instead,
it considered the "total circumstances"6 5 which included the prior
knowledge of the bag gained by the officers, 66 the neatly folded ap-
pearance of the bag," and the odor of hashish. 8 The court then held
that all of these circumstances taken together made -the seizure reason-
able. 
6 9
The court, though, recognized the dangers of such an approach and
attempted to formulate a standard:
Where contraband is believed to be hidden among several items
within a container, such as a suitcase or a dresser drawer, seizure of
the container may well be more difficult to justify. The type of con-
tainer which may reasonably be seized as evidence of a transaction in-
volving narcotics is a container which reasonably appears to hold con-
traband and little else. Moreover, the less portable a container, the
less subject it should be to warrantless seizure as evidence merely by
virtue of its role as a container of contraband. 70
Surely the description of some containers as "less portable" is not a suf-
ficiently definite test. How portable is a purse? Is a suitcase suffi-
ciently "less portable" than a briefcase? It would seem that the very
vagueness of the term commits the California court to a "totality of
the circumstances" approach with the danger that the result will be,
as Chief Justice Traynor warned in Marshall, "fruitless invasions of pri-
opinion which was signed by a total of four Justices, a majority of the court, was cor-
rect in calling for "a forthright overruling of Marshall" in light of the conclusion of
the court's opinion. 10 Cal. 3d at 19, 513 P.2d at 922, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 698. Fur-
thermore, since four of the seven Justices of the court signed the concurring opinion,
Marshall is presumably overruled.
61. 10 Cal. 3d at 5, 513 P.2d at 910, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
62. Id.
63. Id. Dr. Forest Tennant, a noted drug expert, stated that he could not smell
hashish in an airtight container; only a dog or an extraordinary human could do so.
64. Id. at 14, 513 P.2d at 917, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
65. Id. at 17, 513 P.2d at 919, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
66. Id. at 16, 513 P.2d at 919, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 17, 513 P.2d at 919, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
69. Id. at 16-17, 513 P.2d at 919, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
70. Id. at 17-18, 513 P.2d at 920, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
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vacy." 71
Problems similar to those encountered in the area of containers also
arise when the object seized is a private paper7 2 that needs to be read
or, at least, inspected closely in order for its incriminating nature to
be apparent. In Stanley v. Georgia,3 Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion maintained that where police officers had a warrant to search
for certain items and during the course of the search came upon some
motion picture films not listed in the warrant, the films were unlawfully
seized.
74
This is not a case where agents in the course of a lawful search came
upon contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence in plain view.
For the record makes clear that the contents of the film could not be
determined by mere inspection.7 6
Similarly, the contents of private papers cannot be determined unless
the papers are read. The analogy to the Stanley motion pictures is
clear, and, therefore, the seizure of such papers should not be upheld
under the plain view doctrine.7 6
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has, in effect, put limits on the right
of officers to seize documents which have to be read before their incul-
patory nature is revealed. In State v. Pires,7 7 police officers received
a report that the bodies of a child and a semi-conscious woman were
to be found at defendant's address.78 However, an ambulance had
already left by the time the police arrived,70 and no one was left at
the home."0 The officers began to search for victims and went into
the bedroom finding no one. 8' Later the officers went into the
bedroom again and saw a clipboard with writing on it. s2  Some
of the pages on the clipboard contained the inculpatory statements of
71. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
72. For a discussion of what the concept "papers" includes, see Comment, The
Search and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Considerations,
6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 274, 301 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Search].
73. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
74. Id. at 571-72.
75. Id. at 571.
76. As one commentator noted: "The idea that agents have the right to read a letter
merely because it is in plain view is a dangerous extension of the plain view doctrine
and a dangerous inroad on the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment."
Search, supra note 72, at 298 n.140.
77. 201 N.W.2d 153 (Wis. 1972).




82. Id. at 156.
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the defendant.8 3 The tral courts4 and the Wisconsin Supreme Courts5
held that the second warrantless search was unconstitutional. Although
the officers had a right to be in the room, the seizure was unlawful
since it was "only after [the officer] picked the documents up and read
them did he realize their contents.""6
A federal district court has also limited the seizure of papers that
required close inspection and careful reading in order to establish them
as evidence of criminal activity. In In re Calandra,s7 the police had
a search warrant for bookmaking records and wagering parapher-
nalia. 8s They searched the offices of the company and found stock
certificates and other records and forms.8 9  The court held that the
case was close to the facts discussed in Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Stanley v. Georgia,9" wherein the criminal nature of the evi-
dence was not plainly apparent: "[Oiuly after carefully examining
each and every item in this drawer could the agents determine that
they may be evidence of a criminal activity."91 On the other hand,
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 159.
86. Id.
87. 332 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub nom., United States v. Calandra,
465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
The United States Supreme Court did not discuss whether the search and seizure was
unlawful since the government did not seek review of that issue.
88. 332 F. Supp. at 744.
89. Id. at 745.
90. See note 17 supra.
91. 332 F. Supp. at 745. Similarly, in United States v. Henkel, 451 F.2d 777 (3d
Cir. 1971), police had a search warrant for a safe deposit box believed to contain
money stolen during a bank robbery. At the same time the officers checked the serial
numbers against a list of bills taken during another bank robbery. The court upheld
the search:
Had the serial numbers been memorized by the agent, he would immediately have
recognized the money as evidence of another crime in plain view. The mere fact
that the numbers were recorded on a piece of paper in his pocket rather than on
his memory does not control the validity of the search.
Id. at 781 (footnote omitted).
Another case in which the criminal nature of a seized paper was not plainly appar-
ent is People v. LaRocco, 496 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1972), wherein an alleged. forged driv-
er's license and a blank license form were seized during the course of a search for
various other items. The court held that, even if the license and form had been in plain
view, the police had no way of knowing that they were evidence of criminal activity.
Id. at 315-16.
Similarly, in United States v. Smith, 462 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1972), the court upheld
the seizure of personal papers of the defendant discovered during the course of a search
for other items specified in the warrant. The papers, it was argued, tended to show
that defendant had control of the premises being searched. Again, the court did not
consider the question of whether the officer had to read the papers in order to ascertain
their use as evidence.
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some cases have ignored the possibility of constitutional limitations
on the seizure of private papers and are noteworthy only for their lack
of discussion of the issue.
92
It is evident that a person's privacy could be easily threatened by
the search and seizure of papers justified under the plain view doc-
trine. One commentator has suggested a solution:
Whatever the deficiencies of the plain view doctrine as applied to non-
documentary items, its application to papers would appear to encourage
continued exploratory searches through private papers. One means of
guaranteeing that private papers will remain private is to limit the in-
centive for such searches by denying admittance to papers found in
plain view. Such a limitation would not seriously hamper honest law
enforcement since, even though a paper may be in "plain view," its
contents ordinarily cannot be 'ascertained without close scrutiny.
93
Thus, the seizure of papers which must be read in order for their in-
criminating nature to be revealed should not be upheld under the plain
view doctrine since it is not "immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them." 94
B. The Quantum of Evidence Needed to Justify a Seizure
The Coolidge Court seemed to assume that everyone would under-
stand when the incriminating nature of an object was "immediately ap-
parent." However, the interpretation of this standard has produced
wide variations.95 The standard has ranged from mere suspicion to
probable cause to virtual certainty that an item has evidentiary value.
Not all courts, though, have discussed this requirement, even when
from the facts there is some doubt as to whether or not there was any
"nexus" between the item and the crime.96
92. See, e.g., United States v. Leal, 460 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1972) (seizure of
unendorsed traveller's checks seen in an open suitcase upheld without discussion of
necessity to inspect checks to determine if incriminating); State v. Fassler, 503 P.2d
807, 813 (Ariz. 1972) (seizure of address book with name of defendant from office
of co-defendant upheld without comment as to how officer knew it would contain de-
fendant's name); People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 740, 497 P.2d 1121, 1141, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 385, 405 (1972) (since defendant's objection to admission of notebooks and en-
velope was "on grounds other than that [they] were 'communicative' or 'testimonial'
in nature," the court would not review it on appeal). See generally ALL MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 1.03 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1970).
93. Search, supra note 72, at 304.
94. 403 U.S. at 466.
95. See notes 97-126 infra and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., People v. Meneley, 29 Cal. App. 3d 41, 55, 105 Cal. Rptr. 432, 436
(1972) (upholding seizure of clothing with no explanation of why police suspected the
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The plain view doctrine has been used to justify the seizure of items
that, although innocent-looking, are also "suspicion arousing." In
United States v. Hill,97 police officers saw defendant outside of a build-
ing on a deserted, industrial dead-end street.9 The officers' sus-
picions were aroused, 99 and they arrested him. 100 At that point they
saw some keys on the ground in plain view.101  They then opened
the building's garage door with the keys and inside observed tires,
batteries, and automobiles in a stripped condition. 02 The court up-
held the admission of the evidence at a probation revocation hearing"'
on the ground that defendant's actions, while not producing probable
cause, did arouse suspicion. 0 4 The police, though, had no idea that
the keys found in plain view could even be used to open the garage,
and even after the garage door was opened, the "plain view" of the
automobile parts gave the officers only "suspicion" that the items
were stolen. 05 As the dissent pointed out, "the fact that the auto-
mobile parts were in 'plain view' once the door was opened, did not
validate the seizure."'10 This unfortunate extension of the plain view
doctrine is a clear violation of Justice Stewart's caveat in Coolidge that
the plain view doctrine should not "be used to extend a general explor-
atory search from one object to another until something incriminating
clothing had been worn at the time of a murder or had any evidentiary value); Caine
V. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (seizure of stolen wallet
on defendant's table upheld even though it was unclear that police knew a wallet had
been stolen at the time).
97. 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971). Other cases which approved the seizure of items
based on a suspicion that they constituted evidence or which at least adopted some
standard that fell short of probable cause include: United States v. White, 463 F.2d
18, 21 (9th Cir. 1972) (in the course of executing search warrant for other items, FBI
agents "saw" bottles of pills); State v. Anderson, 489 P.2d 722, 724 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1971) (policeman's "belief" that seeds in bottle were marijuana was sufficient for sei-
zure); People v. Shepherd, 33 Cal. App. 3d 866, 109 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (police offi-
cer observed debris "believed" to be marijuana and this belief entitled him to look more
closely to confirm it); Presley v. State, 284 N.E.2d 526, 529 (Ind. CL App. 1972)
(seizure of camera with the "belief' that it was stolen held lawful); State v. Hoffman,
190 S.E.2d 842, 849 (N.C. 1972) (gun was seized lawfully since it was a "suspicious ob-
ject"); Commonwealth v. Watkins, 292 A.2d 505, 507 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972) (police
officer "suspected" that a vial and bottle had been used to cut and mix narcotics).
98. 447 F.2d at 817.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 818.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 819.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 821.
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at last emerges."'0
The supreme courts of Idaho, Colorado, and Alabama, however,
have rejected the Hill notion that a mere suspicion is sufficient to com-
ply with the "immediately apparent" requirement. In State v. Har-
wood, 08 two defendants had met an Idaho conservation officer after
they had been hunting one day. The officer, after talking to the de-
fendants, formed a suspicion that the mountain goat which was in de-
fendant's car had been killed outside the area in which hunting was
permitted.10 9  He then seized it.1 0  The court held that mere sus-
picion was insufficient" and that probable cause should be the stand-
ard:
"It is not enough that the officer suspects in good faith, his suspicion
must be reasonable.... if contraband may be legally seized when the
officer does not have reasonable grounds to believe it is such, it will
lead to many interferences with property when the officer's groundless
suspicions are wrong."
112
Similarly, in People v. LaRocco,"31 the Colorado Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court's order to suppress a forged driver's license
and blank license form seized during a search pursuant to a warrant
for other items." 4 At the time it was seized, the court pointed out that
the license was merely suspected of being forged.:" Thus:
To countenance seizure of evidence not specified in the warrant and
unrelated to the criminal matters under investigation would open wide
the doors to general searches and seizures based upon mere suspicion
but not upon probable cause as constitutionally required." 6 I
Finally, in Shipman v. State,"17 the Alabama Supreme Court held
unlawful the seizure of plastic bags from the occupant of a car stopped
by a police officer who observed the occupant shift the bags to his
boot top since the action only aroused suspicion." 8 The court empha-
107. 403 U.S. at 466.
108. 495 P.2d 160 (Idaho 1972).
109. Id. at 161.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 165.
112. Id. at 164, quoting State v. Elkins, 422 P.2d 250, 254-55 (Ore. 1966). In
Elkins, a police officer found white pills on the person of the arrestee during the course
of a search incident to arrest. Id. at 251. He only suspected that they were contra-
band. Id.
113. 496 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1972).
114. Id. at 315.
115. Id. at 316.
116. Id.
117. 282 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 1973).
118. Id. at 704.
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sized what the consequences of a standard of "mere suspicion" would
be:
It would open the door to unreasonable confiscation of a person's
property while a minute examination of it is made in an effort to find
something criminal .... Ex post facto justification of a seizure made
on mere groundless suspicion is totally contrary to the tenets of the
Fourth Amendment. 19
Furthermore, the court noted that one of the greatest dangers lies in
the possibility that an accused would be held until a determination
could be made as to whether or not an object was actually contraband
or stolen.120
Many other courts have adopted the standard of "probable cause"
or "reasonable cause!' in the determination of when it is immediately
- apparent that an object is incriminating."2' These courts have rea-
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. In addition to Shipman v. State, 282 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 1973) (discussed at text
accompanying notes 117-20 supra), State v. Harwood, 495 P.2d 160 (Idaho 1972) (dis-
cussed at text accompanying notes 108-12 supra), and People v. LaRocco, 496 P.2d
314 (Colo. 1972) (discussed at text accompanying notes 113-16 supra), the following
cases have adopted the standard of probable cause: United States ex rel Myles v. Two-
mey, 352 F. Supp. 180, 182 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (in the course of executing a search war-
rant, police officer may seize outwardly innocent items that are "reasonably believed"
to be stolen); United States v. Hamilton, 328 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 (D. Del. 1971) (sei-
zure of a sawed-off shotgun held lawful where officers had probable cause to believe it
was contraband); Thomas v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 972, 976-80, 99 Cal. Rptr.
647, 649-52 (1972) (seizure of a hand-rolled cigarette which was only a suspicious
object unlawful because probable cause not present); State v. Turner, 504 P.2d 168,
172 (Kan. 1972) (during search pursuant to warrant for other items, seizure of stereo
lawful with probable cause); State v. Jackson, 269 So. 2d 465, 468 (La. 1972) (be-
cause of shape and size of packet of heroin seen around neck of defendant, officer
had probable cause to believe it was contraband); Hebron v. State, 281 A.2d 547, 555-
56 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971) (seizure of television and clothing found in plain view
proper since officer had probable cause to believe they were fruits of crime); Common-
wealth v. Haefeli, 279 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Mass. 1972) (seizure of check-cashing card
and checks lawful since police had "reasonable cause" to believe they were stolen);
People v. Trudeau, 187 N.W.2d 890, 891 (Mich. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965
(1972) (seizure of defendant's shoe unlawful when based on mere suspicion that it
was heel print left at scene of murder); People v. Romano, 192 N.W.2d 271, 274
(Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (seizure of manila envelope was lawful when inspection led
to "reasonable conclusion" it contained narcotics); Wright v. State, 499 P.2d 1216,
1219-21 (Nev. 1972) (seizure of gun lawful when probable cause existed to believe
it was the instrumentality or evidence of a crime); State v. Young, 501 P.2d 1001,
1004 (Ore. Ct. App. 1972) (seizure of part of plant sheriff reasonably believed was
contraband was proper); State v. Redeman, 496 P.2d 230, 231-32 (Ore. Ct. App. 1972)
(only those items out of the total contents of defendant's apartment which the police
had probable cause to believe stolen were admissible); Armour v. Totty, 486 S.W.2d
537, 539-40 (Tenn. 1972) (officer had reasonable belief that plastic bag contained mar-
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soned that, since the plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant
requirement, probable cause, at the very least, should be required.
In United States v. Smollar,122 the court went even further and held
that:
Government officers must have more than mere probable cause that
what they see is seizable. The court adopts this standard because it
is obvious that a probable cause standard would undermine the warrant
requirement. For if government officers could seize anything they
happened to see where they only had probable cause to search or seize
it, there would be no need to obtain warrants to authorize seizures of
objects likely to be found where officers had a right to be.123
The court pointed out that the rationale of the rule of Marron v.
United States,'24 that warrants must particularly describe the things to
be seized, is "that, even where an officer has probable cause to believe
that an item is seizable, there is an independent value in his presenting
his evidence to a neutral magistrate prior to the seizure.'- 25  A for-
tiori it would seem appropriate, that a standard stricter than probable
cause be invoked when the magistrate's scrutiny is entirely lacking. It
might well be argued that the very words "plain view" call for a standard
more rigorous than that of probable cause.' 26
The confusion created by these conflicting interpretations could eas-
ily be resolved if the Supreme Court would adopt one of the competing
standards. It is submitted that the plain view doctrine is an exception
to the warrant requirement and the whole purpose of Justice Stewart's
opinion in Coolidge was to put limits upon the doctrine so that it would
be consistent with the constitutional protections served 'by the warrant
requirement. 2 7  It would be a strange logic that would substitute a
ijuana); State v. Murray, 509 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (seizure of tele-
vision set unlawful when based upon mere suspicion); State v. Day, 503 P.2d 1098,
1101 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (officer could seize pistol he had -reasonable cause to
believe was contraband).
122. 357 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
123. Id. at 632.
124. 275 U.S. 192 (1927). See note 11 supra.
125. 357 F. Supp. at 632.
126. But see United States v. Drew, 451 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1971). There the court
pointed out that "the plain view exception would be worthless if officers had to be
'absolutely certain' that what they saw was seizable." Id. at 233. In Drew, the police
who had stopped a car for a traffic violation noticed a blue opaque plastic folder on
the floor of the car with what appeared to be the bulging outline of a pistol. Here,
the "belief" of the officers that the pistol existed was sufficient to justify the seizure.
Id.
127. 403 U.S. at 467. In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the police, while
searching a house for the defendant, discovered clothing which they believed was worn
[Vol. 7
PLAIN VIEW
standard of less than probable cause for an exception to a warrant
requirement which itself includes within its very statement the require-
ment of probable cause.
II. THE "INADVERTENCE" RULE
Another requirement of the plain view doctrine, as stated in Cool-
idge, is that the discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent:
The rationale of the exception to the warrant requirement, as just
stated, is that a plain-view seizure will not turn an initially valid (and
therefore limited) search into a "general" one, while the inconvenience
of procuring a warrant to cover an inadvertent discovery is great. But
where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance
the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is al-
together different. The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no
inconvenience whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally cog-
nizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as "per se
unreasonable" in the absence of "exigent circumstances. 1 28
by the defendant during a robbery. The defendant argued that the clothing was not
subject to seizure since it was mere evidence. In the course of holding that the cloth-
ing was seizable, the Court stated:
There must, of course, be a nexus-automatically provided in the case of fruits,
instrumentalities or contraband-between the item to be seized and criminal be-
havior. Thus in the case of "mere evidence," probable cause must be examined
in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular ap-
prehension or conviction.
Id. at 307. Thus, the standard which the Court would favor would be one that ei-
ther provided for a "nexus" between the item seized and the crime or used the phrase
"probable cause"
128. 403 U.S. at 469-71. Justice Stewart went on to explain that his discussion of
the case and his rationale corresponded to that given in Trupiano v. United States,
334 U.S. 699 (1948). See note 11 supra. In Trupiano, federal officers raided an ille-
gal distillery, arrested the defendant and seized contraband distillery equipment in plain
view. In Coolidge, as in Trupiano, the determining factors were "advance police
knowledge of the existence and location of evidence, police intention to seize it, and
the ample opportunity for obtaining a search warrant." 403 U.S. at 482. However,
Trupiano was not to be reinstated since the police need not obtain a warrant if they
believe they will find evidence during a search of the person of an arrestee and of
the area under his immediate control, the scope of a valid search incident to an arrest
outlined in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In addition, it was noted
that Trupiano would be inconsistent with the recent cases in the area of auto searches.
403 U.S. at 482.
The dissenting opinions of Justice Black (403 U.S. at 505-10) and of Justice White
(Id. at 513-22) were highly critical of the inadvertence requirement. Justice Black
contended that the Court had, in effect, abolished seizures incident to arrest, for
[olnly rarely can it be said that evidence seized incident to an arrest is truly un-
expected or inadvertent. ... The relevant test is not the reasonableness of the
opportunity to procure a warrant, but the reasonableness of the seizure under all
the circumstances.
Id. at 509. Justice Hugo L. Black cited Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), where
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Most courts have accepted the "inadvertence" requirement.129  The
the police went to the defendant's apartment to arrest him. They did so and saw a
block of marijuana while looking into the kitchen. Justice Black argued that the dis-
covery could not have been inadvertent. 403 U.S. at 507. However, the plurality
pointed out that Ker was upheld because the seizure was incident to the arrest:
"[The marijuana] was in the immediate proximity of the Kers at the moment of their
arrest so that the seizure was unquestionably lawful under the search-incident law of
the time, and might be lawful under the more restrictive standard of Chimel v. Cal-
ifornia. . . " 403 U.S. at 473 n.28 (citation omitted). Furthermore, Justice Stewart
emphasized that the majority opinion did not suggest "that the police must obtain a
warrant if they anticipate that they will find specific evidence during the course of
such a search [incident to an arrest]." Id. at 482.
129. The following courts cite Coolidge favorably and apply the inadvertence rule:
United States v. Lisznyai, 470 F.2d 707, 709-10 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
987 (1973) (although agents had seen incriminating laboratory equipment prior to
its seizure, discovery was inadvertent due to lack of time to procure warrant);
United States v. Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
983 (1973) (seizure of incriminating evidence of illegal drug activity during search
pursuant to valid warrant lawful since no prior knowledge or intent on part of agent);
Martinez v. Turner, 461 F.2d 261, 264-65 (10th Cir. 1972) (discovery of defendant's
coat not inadvertent when police had prior knowledge of it); United States v. Drew,
451 F.2d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1971) (discovery of firearms in defendant's vehicle during
stop for improper lighting held inadvertent); United States v. Forlano, 358 F. Supp.
56, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (evidence obtained from lawful wiretap which did not name
defendant was inadvertent); United States v. Smollar, 357 F. Supp. 628, 632-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (inadvertence rule does not apply to contraband, stolen, or dangerous
objects); Robbins v. Bryant, 349 F. Supp. 94, 95-96 (W.D. Va. 1972) (seizure inadver-
tent even though defendant deputy sheriff in civil rights action seized items not in-
cluded in the search warrant but of which he had been aware); United States v.
Pointer, 348 F. Supp. 600, 604 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (discovery of shotgun lying on seat
of service station truck inadvertent because no prior knowledge); United States v. La-
zar, 347 F. Supp. 225, 229 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (evidence discovered inadvertently before
objects of warrant are found is admissible); United States v. Babich, 347 F. Supp. 157,
160 (D. Nev. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 477 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1973) (police
came upon truck in desert inadvertently but marijuana found in truck was not in plain
view); United States ex rel. Herhal v. Anderson, 334 F. Supp. 733, 734-36 (D. Del.
1971) (during course of search pursuant to search warrant, police inadvertently found
dirt on underside of car); United States v. Hamilton, 328 F. Supp. 1219, 1221 (D.
Del. 1971) (officers conducting lawful search inadvertently came upon shotgun in plain
view); People v. Eastin, 289 N.E.2d 673, 678-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (seizure of evi-
dence not inadvertent when police had prior knowledge); Presley v. State, 284 N.E.2d
526, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (discovery of stolen camera was inadvertent during in-
spection of house for accomplices); Caine v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.2d 824, 827-
28 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (seizure of wallet lawful when there was no prior knowledge
of its location); State v. Jackson, 269 So. 2d 465, 468 (La. 1972) (police officer came
upon package of heroin inadvertently); Neam v. State, 286 A.2d 540, 543 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1972) (while looking for defendant's wallet, officer inadvertently came upon
incriminating identification cards); Commonwealth v. Rand, 296 N.E.2d 200, 203
(Mass. 1973) (discovery of evidence found in vehicle taken to police station for pur-
pose of search not inadvertent); State v. Gallagher, 509 P.2d 852, 857 (Mont. 1973)
(police called by woman to defendant's home had no prior knowledge that evidence
of crime would be found); Barnato v. State, 501 P.2d 643, 647 (Nev. 1972) (seizure
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Iowa Supreme Court, however, indicated that the Coolidge discussion
of plain view might not be of binding force, 30 and the California Su-
preme Court explicitly rejected Coolidge in North v. Superior Coutrt.1' 1
In North, the defendant was arrested in his apartment one day after
his kidnapping victim described him and his car for the police.132  Af-
ter the defendant was arrested, the police seized and searched his
car.'33 Although the police knew the car's location and that it was
probably the instrumentality used in the crime of kidnapping, no
search warrant had been obtained. 3 4 The court held that the seizure
was valid under the plain view doctrine, 3 5 but admitted that, "[i]f
of marijuana plant after two previous observations was not inadvertent); People
v. Palozzi, 346 N.Y.S.2d 595, 600 (Monroe County Ct. 1973) (seizure of defendant's
telephone conversations intercepted under a warrant for another's conversations was not
inadvertent since police suspected and intended to seize them); People v. Avasino, 338
N.Y.S.2d 73, 80 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1972) (seizure of pornographic books not inadvertent
where there was advance police knowledge, intent to seize them and ample opportunity
to obtain a warrant); Morris v. State, 507 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App.
1973) (discovery of marijuana during arrest of defendant in home was inadvertent);
State v. Young, 501 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Ore. Ct. App. 1972) (deputy sheriff called dur-
ing fire found marijuana plant inadvertently); State v. Wilson, 297 A.2d 645, 648 (R.I.
1972) (discovery of gun barrel protruding from seat of car was inadvertent); State
v. Day, 503 P.2d 1098, 1101 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (officer inadvertently discovered
pistol in defendant's possession); State v. Dimmer, 497 P.2d 613, 615 (Wash. Ct. App.
1972) (discovery of prescription bottles found during course of search for other items
was inadvertent).
Other cases have cited with approval to the Coolidge statement of the inadvertence
rule without relating the Coolidge rule to the facts' before them. See, e.g., United
States v. Gargotto, 476 F.2d 1009, 1013 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Sheard, 473
F.2d 139, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Candella, 469 F.2d 173, 175 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Botelho, 360 F. Supp. 620, 624 n.4 (D. Hawaii 1973);
United States v. Ciaccio, 356 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (D. Md. 1972); United States ex
rel. Myles v. Twomey, 352 F. Supp. 180, 182 (N.D. Ill. 1973); United States v. Brewer,
343 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D. Hawaii 1972); State v. Caldwell, 512 P.2d 863, 866 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1973); State v. Krause, 301 A.2d 234, 237 (Conn. 1972); Lowe v. State,
195 S.E.2d 919, 921 (Ga. 1973); State v. Hills, 283 So. 2d 220, 222 (La. 1973); Brown
v. State, 292 A.2d 762, 775-76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972); Commonwealth v. Haefeli,
279 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Mass. 1972); Wright v. State, 499 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Nev. 1972);
State v. Person, 298 N.E.2d 922, 926 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1973); Commonwealth v. Daven-
port, 308 A.2d 85, 89 (Pa. 1973); Commonwealth v. Rota, 292 A.2d 496, 498-99 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1973); State v. Larkin, 202 N.W.2d 862, 865 (S.D. 1972); Armour v. Totty,
486 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Tenn. 1972); State v. Murray, 509 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1973); Ball v. State, 205 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Wis. 1973); State v. Pires, 201 N.W.
2d 153, 159 (Wis. 1972).
130. State v. King, 191 N.W.2d 650 (Iowa 1971) (as officers approached automobile
to arrest suspects they saw burglary tools in plain view).
131. 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972).
132. Id. at 304, 502 P.2d at 1306, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
133. Id. at 304-05, 502 P.2d at 1306, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
134. Id. at 305-06, 502 P.2d at 1308, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
135. Id. at 308, 502 P.2d at 1309, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
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the plurality opinion in Coolidge were entitled to binding effect as
precedent, we would have difficulty distinguishing its holding from the
instant case, for the discovery of petitioner's car was no more 'inadver-
tent' than in Coolidge."'"0 However, it continued, only four members
of the court signed Part 11-C of the opinion.137
The California Supreme Court ignored the concurrence of a fifth
member of the Court, Justice Harlan, in Part 11-D of Justice Stewart's
opinion wherein he criticized much of Justice White's dissent and, in
so doing, gave support to the basic theme of Part IT-C on the plain
view exception. 138 Justice Sullivan of the California court recognized
this in his North dissent, pointing out that Part 11-D of Coolidge was
"addressed primarily to Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion which
'marshals the arguments that can be made against our interpretation
of the 'automobile' and 'plain view' exceptions to the warrant require-
ment.'""" As Justice Sullivan maintained, "Justice Harlan's limited
concurrence sweeps more broadly than the majority would allow."'140
In addition to the problem of clarifying Coolidge's precedential
force, two other significant problems have arisen in the lower courts'
interpretations of the inadvertence requirement. The first concerns
the degree of expectation which is required on the part of the police
in order for a discovery to be inadvertent. After Coolidge was first
decided, some commentators formulated the various interpretations
that might result. 141 One author argued:
If the rule is taken to mean that a plain-view discovery will be held
invalid, because not inadvertent, only when the police have probable
cause to believe that the evidence would be found, it will be of limited
effect ...
The inadvertence rule will be far more significant if it is interpreted as
requiring the invalidation of discoveries when the police have an ex-
136. Id. at 307, 502 P.2d at 1308, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
137. Id.
138. 403 U.S. at 444.
139. 8 Cal. 3d at 316, 502 P.2d at 1315, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
140. Id. ht 317, 502 P.2d at 1315, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 843. In People v. McKinnon,
7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972), the California Supreme Court
made the same argument in regard to Part H-B of Coolidge which "purported to nar-
row the Carroll-Chambers rule." The court concluded that "the judgment of an equally
divided United States Supreme Court 'is without force as precedent.'" Id. at 911, 500
P.2d at 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The California court's reasoning has not gone
without criticism. See, e.g., Note, People v. McKinnon-A New Move in Search and
Seizure, 24 HAS=TNGS L.J. 393, 408 n.96 (1973).
141. LaFave, supra note 9, at 29-30; Search and Seizure, supra note 9, at 699-700;
The Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 244-45.
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pectation that evidence will be discovered on the premises but lack prob-
able cause to search.1
42
The prediction was that the courts would narrowly interpret the inad-
vertence rule, applying it only when the police had probable cause
to believe that evidence would be found.143  This has been borne out
by the cases in which it is discussed.' Surprisingly, though, this
particular aspect of the inadvertence requirement has not been as con-
troversial among the lower courts as it was among commentators.
1 45
This may be either because it is obvious when the police know of
evidence beforehand and plan to seize it or because the courts have
chosen to disregard the requirement and thus fail to discuss it at all."'
The second major problem that has arisen in -this area has been
in trying to determine whether the inadvertence requirement should
only apply to "evidence," but not to contraband and stolen or danger-
ous goods. In the Coolidge opinion, Justice Stewart described the ra-
tionale for the requirement:
If the initial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails to men-
tion a particular object, though the police know its location and intend
to seize it, then there is a violation of the express constitutional require-
142. The Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 244-45.
143. Id. at 250. In State v. Alexander, 495 P.2d 51 (Ore. Ct. App. 1972), the police
had an arrest warrant for the defendant who had sold methamphetamine to an under-
cover officer. The officer entered the apartment at the invitation of defendant and
through a room divider saw some baggies which he concluded contained marijuana.
Other officers were alerted and came to the apartment, arrested the defendant, and
seized the marijuana. The court upheld the seizure on the ground that it was in the
officer's plain view but did not discuss the inadvertence requirement. Id. at 53-54.
The dissenting judge, however, argued that the seizure was not inadvertent, as the offi-
cer had testified that he had been in the apartment several times before and had seen
marijuana there. He also pointed out that "equating non-inadvertence with probable
cause may be the most reasonable reading of Justice Stewart's opinion." Id. at 55 n.2.
144. For example, in Lewis v. Cardwell, 476 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1973), the court
held that "when law enforcement officers have prior knowledge amounting to probable
cause establishing the nexus between the article sought and the place of seizure a war-
rant must be obtained in order to protect the fourth amendment principle that warrant-
less seizures are per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances." Id. at
470 (emphasis added). There the police dispatched a wrecker to a place where they
believed an automobile was parked. The warrantless seizure could not be justified un-
der the plain view doctrine since the officers never observed the vehicle at all. Id.
145. See LaFave, supra note 9, at 25-26, 29; Landynski, supra note 9, at 349-53;
The Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 243-46.
146. One extreme example is the case of State v. Knapp, 501 P.2d 264 (Utah 1972),
where the Utah Supreme Court did not cite any cases in its opinion. In that case,
a sheriff went to the home that defendant was constructing. He recognized a door
and some other items as being stolen. The next day the sheriff returned and removed
some copper tubing from the house. Clearly, the discovery was not inadvertent and
it would seem that there was sufficient time in which to obtain a search warrant.
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ment of "Warrants . . . particularly describing . . . [the] things to be
seized." The initial intrusion may, of course, be legitimated not by a
warrant but by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, such
as hot pursuit or search incident to lawful arrest. But to extend the
scope of such an intrusion to the seizure of objects-not contraband
nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves-which the police know in ad-
vance they will find in plain view and intend to seize, would fly in
the face of the basic rule that no amount of probable cause can justify
a warrantless seizure. 14
7
Thus, the reasoning behind the inadvertence rule is that it is simply
preferable to have "'advance judicial approval of searches and seiz-
ures. "148 However, an advance judicial decision does not seem to be
required if the police anticipate that they will find contraband or stolen
or dangerous goods.'1 9  One commentator has suggested a possible
explanation:
The exception for contraband might be explained on the ground that
the margin of error is slight, but it is unclear on what basis the excep-
tion for stolen goods could be explained. Perhaps the notion is that
if the goods are stolen, the police will not have interfered with lawful
possession, but this misses the point that the question to be decided
is whether the items are in fact stolen, which is not always obvious."' 0
The courts that have considered this issue have divided. In United
States v. Smollar,'5' the court held that the "inadvertence" require-
ment applied only to objects that are "not contraband nor stolen nor
dangerous in themselves."' 25  In Smollar, a postal inspector rode in
the car of the defendant whom he had just arrested for mail theft.
At that time, the agent saw a book which had a credit card protruding
from it."' 3 The court upheld the seizure under the plain view doc-
trine, 5 4 reasoning that since it was immediately apparent that the
credit card was stolen, the inadvertence rule simply did not apply.' 5
Another court, however, has taken the position that the seizure of
contraband is subject to the inadvertence requirement. In Barnato
v. State,"'6 an animal control officer, while placing a trap for a wild
147. 403 U.S. at 471 (emphasis added).
148. LaFave, supra note 9, at 27.
149. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
150. LaFave, supra note 9, at 26 n.61.
151. 357 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
152. Id. at 633.
153. Id. at 630.
154. Id. at 632.
155. Id. at 633.
156. 501 P.2d 643 (Ney. 1972).
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cat on defendant's property (at the defendant's request), 15' saw plants
which he believed were marijuana."5" The following day the control
officer and a deputy sheriff surreptitiously entered the defendant's yard
and took one of the leaves from the plant.159  Believing that the entry
was unlawful, 160 the District Attorney's deputy suggested that they
make another visit to check the trap with the consent of the defend-
ant.161 During this visit, another leaf was taken.' 62  The Nevada Su-
preme Court held that the situation was no different in principle from
that in Coolidge in that the discovery of the evidence on the second
seizure was not inadvertent. 163  Here "the discovery was anticipated,
the location of the marijuana was known in advance and the police in-
tended to seize it."' 64  Thus, the court applied the inadvertence re-
quirement even when contraband was involved.
The inadvertence requirement, then, has been accepted by the ma-
jority of courts that cite Coolidge in discussing the plain view doc-
trine.' 65 The lower courts have all but ignored the arguments that
have been made against this rule. One argument has been made that,
since the police must have a prior justification for being in a place
where incriminating objects can be seen in plain view,
the inadvertence rule does not protect against an invasion of privacy,
but only against intrusion upon a possessory interest in personality, ad-
mittedly (in Justice Stewart's words) a "minor peril to Fourth Amend-
ment protections."'166
One commentator believed that "inadvertence" burdened the warrant
system' 6 7 and that "mischief" might result from its application.'6 8 But
his fear that evidence which is otherwise lawfully obtained might be





162. Id. at 645.
163. Id. at 647.
164. Id. See also People v. Eastin, 289 N.E.2d 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
165. See note 129 supra.
166. LaFave, supra note 9, at 26.
167. Id. at 28.
168. Id. at 29. The possible mischief is that upon a motion to suppress, there will
be an inquiry as to whether or not the discovery was inadvertent:
Such an after-the-fact inquiry into what the officer intended or knew, especially
when it is to his advantage to claim a lack of such knowledge or intent, is no
more likely to be fruitful here than in other contexts.
Id. However, the courts have not seemed to experience difficulty with this rule as
the cases cited in note 129 supra demonstrate.
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excluded due to a failure to obtain a warrant is not persuasive for
a number of reasons.
First, the Coolidge Court emphasized its preference for warrants, de-
claring that whenever possible a magistrate should decide whether an
item is properly subject to seizure.'69 Second, the courts are reason-
able in looking to the circumstances surrounding a failure to obtain
a warrant for a particular item that the police expect to find. 7 ° Finally,
the Coolidge opinion made clear that the inadvertence requirement
did not apply to items found during a lawful search incident to arrest
under the Chimel limitations. 1  Thus, it would not be an overwhelm-
ing burden on the police to obtain a warrant.172  When one balances
the improbable risk of losing evidence with the constitutional protec-
tions furthered by this requirement, the inadvertence rule does not
work "mischief."
CONCLUSION
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court
defined the limits of the plain view exception to the warrant require-
ment of the fourth amendment. 7 3  Emphasizing the constitutionally
mandated preference for a warrant issued upon probable cause, 7 1 the
Court attempted to limit the circumstances under which the application
of the plain view exception would permit deviation from the warrant
requirement.Y7 5  The Court held that a plain view seizure is proper
only when the object seized was inadvertently discovered in plain
169. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
170. A good example of this is United States v. Lisznyai, 470 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 987 (1973). In that case, federal narcotics agents
knocked at the door of defendant's apartment which was under surveillance. They
claimed to be police officers who were in search of a fugitive and who needed to use
the telephone. The agents observed laboratory equipment. Later in the day the agents
believed that defendant was about to flee the apartment, so they arrested him and
seized the equipment. The court held that
Coolidge does not require suppression of evidence seized in plain view during an
arrest where the circumstances have become exigent merely because prior knowl-
edge of the evidence was acquired shortly before the seizure.
Id. at 710.
171. See note 6 supra. For example, in United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d
Cir. 1972), the court held that, even though agents obviously believed that they would
find heroin near the person whom they arrested, the seizure was lawful under Chimel.
The inadvertence rule did not apply in such a case. Id. at 1034-35.
172. 403 U.S. at 469-70.
173. Id. at 464-73.
174. Id. at 467. See note 4 supra.
175. 403 U.S. at 468-71.
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view170 and only when its incriminating nature was immediately ap-
parent.177  The Court thus manifested a clear purpose of narrow con-
struction and strict application of the plain view exception.
Some lower courts, however, have not followed the Court's lead. 17
They have hedged the requirement of physical plain view by inventing
such broadening concepts as "constructive sight' 79 and "totality of the
circumstances."' 80  Similarly, the requirement that the incriminating
nature of the object in plain view be immediately apparent has been
circumscribed by those courts adopting a standard of less than probable
cause.' 8 ' The inadvertence requirement has been rejected outright
by at least one court'8 2 while others have been unable to agree on
whether its application should be confined to the discovery of "evi-
dence"'" 3 or extended to those objects which are contraband, stolen
or dangerous181
It is clear from the response of the lower courts that the Coolidge
effort to clarify the plain view doctrine has not achieved complete
success. It is submitted that the very expression of the doctrine needs
clarification in view of the "constructive sight" extension of the literal
meaning of the term "plain view." A further question is the permis-
sibility, not to mention the logic, of the adoption by some courts of
a standard of less than probable cause for the invocation of an excep-
tion to a warrant requirement itself hinged on probable cause. The
Court also must clarify the application of the inadvertence requirement
to stolen, contraband, and dangerous objects. Finally, and most bas-
ically, the authority of the Coolidge opinion must be clarified in view
of its questioning by the supreme court of the nation's most populous
state.
Diane Eyre Scott
176. Id. at 469-71.
177. Id. at 466.
178. See notes 18-71 supra and accompanying text
179. See notes 18-28 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 97-106 supra and accompanying text.
182. See notes 131-37 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 151-55 supra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 157-64 supra and accompanying text.
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